Preview draft. Copy and visuals are pending review and may change before launch.

Concept

Consent receipts and verifiable consent records

When a person says they never agreed to something the system says they did, the record that settles it can't be the same system being disputed.

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Identity, Credentials, and Authentication · Published 2026-09-07

What a checkbox in a database actually proves

A simple database flag recording that consent was given — a boolean, a timestamp — proves very little on its own about what a person actually saw or agreed to at the time. The same system that recorded the flag could, in principle, have recorded it incorrectly, or had it altered afterward, and the flag alone offers no way to independently confirm which is true. A consent receipt is meant to close this gap: a durable record, tied specifically to what was actually disclosed and agreed to, rather than just the fact that some agreement was logged.

The distinction matters most exactly when it's needed most — during a dispute, when a person claims they never consented to something the system's records say they did. A mutable flag settles nothing in that moment; a properly constructed, independently verifiable receipt can.

What makes a receipt actually verifiable

A receipt worth relying on captures the specifics of what was presented — the exact terms, the exact scope — at the moment of consent, tied together in a way that resists being altered after the fact, the same underlying property tamper-evident logging provides for other kinds of records. A 'receipt' that's just as mutable as the checkbox it's meant to replace hasn't actually solved the problem; it's only renamed it.